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Abstract—In this paper, a distribution system operator (DSO)
framework is proposed to optimally coordinate distributed energy
resources (DER) aggregators’ comprehensive participation in
retail energy market as well as wholesale energy and regu-
lation markets. Various types of DER aggregators, including
energy storage aggregators (ESAGs), dispatchable distributed
generation aggregators (DDGAGs), electric vehicles charging
stations (EVCSs), and demand response aggregators (DRAGs),
are modeled in the proposed DSO framework. Distribution
network constraints are considered by using a linearized power
flow. The problem is modeled using mixed-integer linear pro-
gramming (MILP) which can be solved by commercial solvers.
Case studies are performed to analyze the interactions between
DER aggregators and wholesale/retail electricity markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to environmental issues and increasing demand, the
installed capacity of distributed energy resources (DER) is
growing rapidly. DER aggregators, with low operating costs
and fast ramping capability, can effectively participate in
the wholesale energy and regulation markets. However, to
participate in the wholesale markets, DER aggregators need
to control DER power outputs across the distribution network,
which will cause security and reliability issues to the distribu-
tion system operation. Hence, there is a need for an entity that
coordinate DER aggregators to participate in the wholesale and
retail markets while ensuring distribution network security.
Recently, many issues have been investigated for DER mar-
ket participation [1]–[7]. In [1], the DER aggregator is defined
to enable DER market participation. In [2], DER wholesale
market participation is enabled through the virtual power
plant. In [3], a decentralized approach, based on Dantzig-
Wolfe decomposition, is proposed for DER coordination. This
approach allows a numerous number of households to interact
with an aggregator to minimize the total cost of purchasing
electricity. In [4], [5], the optimal operation of a microgrid
for its wholesale market participation is presented. Above
previous works neglect the distribution network power flow
constraints, therefore ignore the distribution network security
while coordinating DER market participation. In [6], the
bidding strategy of the virtual power plant considering the
demand response market is presented. The demand response
market is defined as a stage between the day-ahead market
and the real-time market. In [7], the optimal bidding strategy
of EV aggregators for participating in the day-ahead and the
real-time markets is presented. In [6], [7], DC power flow is
presented as distribution power balance constraints, which is
inappropriate due to high impedances in distribution grids.
Motivated by the increasing DER penetration level and
emerging smart distribution grid technologies, the power in-
dustry calls for a distirbution operation framework which
can handle DER market participation at the distribution level
while respecting the distirbution system operating constraints.
Recently, the distribution system operator (DSO) is introduced
to operate the distribution system and retail market with DER
integration [8]–[10]. In [8], a day-ahead market framework
operated by a DSO is presented. The DSO pays the distribution
market participants at distribution locational marginal prices
(D-LMPs). However, the distribution network and related
constraints are not considered in the proposed model. In [9],
a two-stage stochastic programming is applied to model day-
ahead energy and reserve markets operated by a DSO. In [10],
a distribution market operator (DMO) is defined which gathers
offers from microgrids and aggregates them to participate in
the wholesale market. A penalty factor is defined to reprensent
the relationship betwen D-LMP and transmission-level LMP.
Both [9] and [10] adopt DC power flow as the distribution
system model, which is insufficient as discussed previously.
To the best of our knowledge, the DSO framework for
optimal coordination of DER aggregators’ participation in
wholesale energy and regulation markets as well as retail
energy market has not been studied yet. In this paper, a DSO
framework is proposed based on the mixed-integer linear pro-
gramming (MILP) formulation. The proposed DSO operates
the reatil energy market and also gathers offers from DER
aggregators for wholesale energy and regulation markets par-
ticipation. Various types of DER aggregators, including energy
storage aggregators (ESAGs), dispatchable distributed gen-
eration (DG) aggregators (DDGAGs), electric vehicles (EV)
charging stations (EVCSs), and demand response aggregators
(DRAGs), are considered in the proposed DSO framework.
Moreover, the distribution network constraints are considered
using a linearized power flow. Case studies are performed
to analyze the interactions between DER aggregators and
wholesale/retail electricity markets.
II. DSO MARKET FORMULATION
In this paper, the DSO is defined as a mediator that
participates in the wholesale markets on one side and interacts
with DER aggregators and end-user customers on the other
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side. Various types of DER aggregators submit their offers
to the DSO. The DSO collects these offers to operate the
retail market as well as coordinate the offers to construct
an aggregated bid for participating in day-ahead wholesale
energy and regulation markets operated by the independent
system operator (ISO). At the wholesale level, this paper
assumes the market framework of California ISO (CAISO),
whose pay-for-performance regulation market considers offers
for both regulation capacity (with capacity-up and capacity-
down offers) and regulation mileage [11]. The DSO is modeled
as a price-taker in the day-ahead wholesale market. The MILP
formulation of this DSO framework is presented below.
A. Objective Function
The proposed DSO minimizes the total operating cost while
maximizing total social welfare in the distribution network.
The regulation market model in [12], [13] is adopted. The
objective function is presented in (1).
min
∑
t∈T
[−P subt piet − rsub,upt picap,upt − rsub,dnt picap,dnt
− rsub,upt Supt µupt pimil,upt − rsub,dnt Sdnt µdnt pimil,dnt
+
∑
k∈{K2,K4}
Pt,kpi
e
t,k −
∑
k3∈K3
Pt,k3pi
e
t,k3
+
∑
k∈K
[rupt,kpi
cap,up
t,k + r
dn
t,kpi
cap,dn
t,k
+ rupt,kS
up
t µ
up
t pi
mil,up
t,k + r
dn
t,kS
dn
t µ
dn
t pi
mil,dn
t,k ]
−
∑
k1∈K1
∑
a∈A
Pa,t,k1pi
e
a,t,k1 ]
(1)
where t and T are the index and set for the entire operating
timespan; k and K = {K1,K2,K3,K4} are the index and
set for all DER aggregators; k1 and K1 are the index and
set for all DRAGs; k2 and K2 are the index and set for all
ESAGs; k3 and K3 are the index and set for all EVCSs; k4
and K4 are the index and set for all DDGAGs; a and A
are the index and set for all demand blocks; P subt , r
sub,up
t ,
and rsub,dnt are the DSO’s aggregated offers to wholesale
energy, regulation capacity-up and capacity-down markets,
respectively; piet , pi
cap,up
t , and pi
cap,dn
t are the wholesale energy,
regulation capacity-up, and capacity-down prices, respectively;
pimil,upt and pi
mil,dn
t are the wholesale regulation mileage-up
and mileage-down prices; Pt,k, r
up
t,k and r
dn
t,k are the energy,
regulation capacity-up and capacity-down offers made by DER
aggregator k with corresponding prices piet,k, pi
cap,up
t,k , pi
cap,dn
t,k ,
respectively; µupt and µ
dn
t are historical scores for providing
regulation mileage-up and mileage-down services; Supt and
Sdnt are the regulation mileage-up and mileage-down ratios
(the expected mileage for 1MW provided regulation capac-
ity); Pa,t,k1 and pi
e
a,t,k1
are the power consumption and the
corresponding energy price at each demand block.
B. Constraints for Demand Response Aggregators (DRAGs)
The operating constraints for DRAGs are as follows:∑
a∈A
Pa,t,k1 − rcap,dnt,k1 ≥ 0; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k1 ∈ K1 (2)
∑
a∈A
Pa,t,k1 + r
cap,up
t,k1
≤
∑
a∈A
Pmaxa,k1 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k1 ∈ K1 (3)
0 ≤ Pa,t,k1 ≤ Pmaxa,k1 ; ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T, ∀k1 ∈ K1 (4)
0 ≤ rcap,upt,k1 ≤ r
cap,up,max
t,k1
; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k1 ∈ K1 (5)
0 ≤ rcap,dnt,k1 ≤ r
cap,dn,max
t,k1
; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k1 ∈ K1 (6)
where Pmaxa,t,k1 is the maximum power consumption at each
demand block; rcap,up,maxt,k1 and r
cap,dn,max
t,k1 are the maximum
allowed regulation capacity-up and capacity-down offers.
Equations (2) and (3) limit the DRAG’s offers to energy,
regulation capacity-up and capcity-down markets. Equation (4)
ensures that the real power offered at each demand block is
within its permitted range. Equations (5) and (6) ensure that
the regulation capacity-up and capacity-down offers are lower
than their maximum permitted values.
C. Constraints for Energy Storage Aggregators (ESAGs)
The operating constraints for ESAGs are as follows:
Pt,k2 = Et−1,k2 − Et,k2 + (1/ηdik2)rcap,upt,k2 µ
up
t
− (ηchk2 )rcap,dnt,k2 µdnt ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2
(7)
Pt,k2 = (1/η
di
k2)P
di
t,k2 − (ηchk2 )P cht,k2 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (8)
rcap,upt,k2 = r
cap,up,di
t,k2
+ rcap,dn,cht,k2 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (9)
rcap,dnt,k2 = r
cap,dn,di
t,k2
+ rcap,up,cht,k2 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (10)
Emink2 ≤ Et,k2 ≤ Emaxk2 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (11)
0 ≤ P dit,k2 ≤ bt,k2DRmaxk2 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (12)
0 ≤ rcap,up,dit,k2 ≤ bt,k2DRmaxk2 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (13)
0 ≤ rcap,dn,dit,k2 ≤ bt,k2DRmaxk2 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (14)
0 ≤ P cht,k2 ≤ (1− bt,k2)CRmaxk2 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (15)
0 ≤ rcap,up,cht,k2 ≤ (1− bt,k2)CRmaxk2 ;∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (16)
0 ≤ rcap,dn,cht,k2 ≤ (1− bt,k2)CRmaxk2 ;∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2 (17)
rcap,dn,dit,k2 ≤ P dit,k2 ≤ DRmaxk2 − r
cap,up,di
t,k2
;
∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2
(18)
rcap,dn,cht,k2 ≤ P cht,k2 ≤ CRmaxk2 − r
cap,up,ch
t,k2
;
∀t ∈ T, ∀k2 ∈ K2
(19)
where Et,k2 is the charging level; η
ch
k2
and ηdik2 are the charging
and discharging efficiancies; P dit,k2 is the discharging power;
P cht,k2 is the charging power; r
cap,up,di
t,k2
and rcap,dn,dit,k2 are
the regulation capacity-up and capacity-down offers in the
discharging mode; rcap,dn,cht,k2 and r
cap,up,ch
t,k2
are the regulation
capacity-up and capacity-down offers in the charging mode;
CRmaxk2 and DR
max
k2 are the maximum charging and discharg-
ing rates; bt,k2 is a binary variable indicating the charging
(bt,k2 = 0) and discharging (bt,k2 = 1) modes.
Equation (7) represents ESAG’s power injection. ESAG’s
offers to the energy, regulation capacity-up and capacity-down
markets are decomposed into charging and discharging terms
by Equations (8)-(10). Equation (11) limits the charge level
of ESAGs. Equations (12)-(17) ensure that ESAG’s offers to
the energy, regulation capacity-up and capacity-down markets
are in their permitted ranges. Equations (18)-(19) limit ESAG’s
offers to the energy, regulation capacity-up and capacity-down
markets with respect to the charging and discharging rates.
D. Constraints for EV Charging Stations (EVCSs)
EVCSs are modeled as EV charging aggregators and are
assumed to have unidirectional power flow as assumed in [13].
Constraints related to the operation of EVCSs are as follows:
0 ≤ Pt,k3 ≤ ERmaxk3 bk3 ; ∀t ∈ T
′
, ∀k3 ∈ K3 (20)
0 ≤ rcap,upt,k3 ≤ ERRmaxk3 bk3 ; ∀t ∈ T
′
, ∀k3 ∈ K3 (21)
0 ≤ rcap,dnt,k3 ≤ ERRmaxk3 bk3 ; ∀t ∈ T
′
, ∀k3 ∈ K3 (22)
Pt,k3 + r
cap,up
t,k3
≤ ERmaxk3 ; ∀t ∈ T
′
, ∀k3 ∈ K3 (23)
Pt,k3 − rcap,dnt,k3 ≥ 0; ∀t ∈ T
′
, ∀k3 ∈ K3 (24)
0.9CLmaxk3 bk3 ≤ Eintk3 bk3 +
∑
t∈T ′
[Pt,k3 + r
cap,up
t,k3
µupt
− rcap,dnt,k3 µdnt ]γchk3 ≤ CLmaxk3 bk3 ; ∀k3 ∈ K3
(25)
where T
′ ⊆ T is the set of hours when EVs are available;
ERmaxk3 is the maximum charging rate; ERR
max
k3
is the max-
imum permitted value for regulation capacity offers, CLmaxk3
is the maximum charge level; Eintk3 is the initial charge level;
γchk3 is the charging efficiancy; bk3 is a binary variable which
enables the DSO not to allocate the minimum power to EVCSs
when their offering price is low.
Equations (20)-(24) limit EVCS’s offers to the energy,
regulation capacity-up and capacity-down markets. Equation
(25) ensures that the charge level of EVs is full.
E. Constraints for Dispatchable DG Aggregators (DDGAGs)
The operating constraints for DDDAGs are as follows:
Pt,k4 + r
cap,up
t,k4
≤ Pmaxk4 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k4 ∈ K4 (26)
Pt,k4 − rcap,dnt,k4 ≥ Pmink4 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k4 ∈ K4 (27)
0 ≤ rcap,upt,k4 ≤ RUk4 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k4 ∈ K4 (28)
0 ≤ rcap,dnt,k4 ≤ RDk4 ; ∀t ∈ T, ∀k4 ∈ K4 (29)
where Pmaxk4 and P
min
k4
are the maximum and minimum power
generations; RUk4 and RDk4 are the maximum ramp-up and
ramp-down rates.
Equations (26) and (27) limit DDDAG’s offers to the energy,
regulation capacity-up and capacity-down markets. Equations
(28) and (29) ensure the regulation capacity-up/capacity-down
offers are lower than maximum ramp-up/ramp-down rates.
F. Distribution Power Flow Equations
The linearized power flow equations are adopted from [14]:∑
k1∈K1
∑
a∈A
Hn,k1Pa,t,k1 +
∑
k3∈K3
Hn,k3Pt,k3 + P
D
t,n
−
∑
k2∈K2
Hn,k2Pt,k2 −
∑
k4∈K4
Hn,k4Pt,k4
+Hsubn P
sub
t +
∑
j∈J
Plj,tAj,n = 0; ∀t ∈ T, ∀n ∈ N
(30)
1 2 3 4 5
Main 
Substation
DRDDGES EV
0.06+j0.04 0.14+j0.14 0.27+j0.27 0.27+j0.42
Fig. 1. The small distribution network for case studies.
∑
k1∈K1
∑
a∈A
Hn,k1Pa,t,k1tanφk1 +Q
D
t,n
−
∑
k4∈K4
Hn,k4Pt,k4tanφk4
+Hsubn Q
sub
t +
∑
j∈J
Qlj,tAj,n = 0; ∀t ∈ T, ∀n ∈ N
(31)
Vm,t = Vn,t − (rjPlj,t + xjQlj,t); ∀t ∈ T, ∀m ∈ N,
∀n ∈ N, C(m,n) = 1, A(j, n) = 1 (32)
V min ≤ Vn,t ≤ V max; ∀t ∈ T, ∀n ∈ N (33)
− Plmax ≤ Plj,t ≤ Plmax; ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ J (34)
−Qlmax ≤ Qlj,t ≤ Qlmax; ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ J (35)
rsub,upt =
∑
k2∈K2
rcap,upt,k2 +
∑
k4∈K4
rcap,upt,k4
+
∑
k1∈K1
rcap,dnt,k1 +
∑
k3∈K3
rcap,dnt,k3 ; ∀t ∈ T
(36)
rsub,dnt =
∑
k2∈K2
rcap,dnt,k2 +
∑
k4∈K4
rcap,dnt,k4
+
∑
k1∈K1
rcap,upt,k1 +
∑
k3∈K3
rcap,upt,k3 ; ∀t ∈ T
(37)
where Hn,k is the mapping matrix of DER aggregator k to
bus n; PDt,n and Q
D
t,n are the inelastic active and reactive
power loads at each node; Plj,t and Qlj,t are the active and
reactive power flow at branch j; Aj,n is the incidence matrix
of branches and buses; φ is the phase angle; Cm,n is the
connecting nodes matrix.
Equations (30) and (31) represent the active and reactive
power flow. Voltage drop at each line is represented by
equation (32) and is limited by equation (33). Active and
reactive power limits at each line are represented by (34)
and (35). Equations (36) and (37) represent DSO’s aggregated
offers for participating in the wholesale energy, regualtion
capacity-up and capacity-down markets.
III. CASE STUDIES
Case studies are performed on the small distribution net-
work shown in Fig.1. The system contains 5 nodes, where
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}; 4 lines, where J = {1, 2, 3, 4}; a DRAG,
where k1 = {1}; an ESAG, where k2 = {2}; an EVCS,
where k3 = {3}; a DDGAG, where k4 = {4}. The studies are
performed over 24 hours, T = {1, 2, ..., 24}. EVs are available
between hour 16 and hour 24, T
′
= {16, 17, ..., 24}. Initial
charge level of ESAG is 8MW . The following parameters
are assumed: ηchk2 = η
di
k2
= 1, Emink2 = 2MW , E
max
k2
=
10MW , DRmaxk2 = CR
max
k2
= 5MW , Eintk3 = 2MW ,
ERmaxk3 = 5MW , ERR
max
k3
= 0.5MW , Pmink4 = 0,
TABLE I
MARKET PARTICIPANTS PRICES ($/MW ) AND REGULATION SIGNALS
(P.U.).
t Wholesale ESAG DDGAG EVCS DRAG Regulation
E C E C E C E C E C up dn
1 24.3 14.7 25 23 28 27 29 30.5 29 30 0.45 0.42
2 23.7 17.3 25 23 28 27 29 30.5 29 30 0.45 0.42
3 23 16.6 25 23 28 27 29 30.5 29 30 0.45 0.42
4 23 16.6 25 23 28 27 29 30.5 29 30 0.45 0.42
5 23.7 17.3 25 23 28 27 29 30.5 29 30 0.45 0.42
6 25.9 22.7 28 25 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.48 0.48
7 29.4 30.4 28 25 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.48 0.48
8 30.7 33.6 28 25 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.48 0.48
9 30.1 33.6 28 25 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.48 0.48
10 29.1 31.4 28 25 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.48 0.48
11 28.8 30.4 28 25 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.48 0.48
12 28.2 24.3 28 25 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.48 0.48
13 27.5 24.3 27 24 28.5 27.5 29 30.5 29 30 0.5 0.51
14 27.2 24.3 27 24 28.5 27.5 29 30.5 29 30 0.5 0.51
15 27.2 24.3 27 24 28.5 27.5 29 30.5 29 30 0.5 0.51
16 27.5 24.3 27 24 28.5 27.5 29 30.5 29 30 0.5 0.51
17 28.2 28.2 30 27 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.5 0.51
18 30.4 28.8 30 27 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.5 0.51
19 32 33.6 30 27 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.5 0.51
20 32 33.6 30 27 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.5 0.5
21 31 32 30 27 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.5 0.5
22 29.4 32 28 25 29 28 29.5 31 30 31 0.5 0.5
23 27.5 25.6 28 25 28 27 29 30.5 29 30 0.42 0.45
24 25.3 22.4 28 25 28 27 29 30.5 29 30 0.42 0.45
Pmaxk4 = 5MW , RUk4 = RDk4 = 1MW , P
max
a,t,k1
= 10MW ,
rcap,up,maxk1 = r
cap,dn,max
k1
= 1MW .
The energy and regulation capacity prices in [12] are con-
sidered. The hourly factors in [15] are used to generate hourly
prices. The regulation capacity-up and capacity-down prices
are assumed to be equal. Regulation mileage-up and mileage-
down prices are assumed to be equal. Regulation mileage
prices are assumed to be 1/20 of corresponding regulation
capacity prices. Hourly energy prices, capacity up/down prices,
and hourly regulation signals are given in Table I, where E
denotes energy price, C denotes regulation capacity price.
1) Market Outcomes: The outcomes of DSO market co-
ordination are presented in Fig. 2. The trades between the
DSO and the wholesale market are shown in Fig. 2(a).
The awarded energy and regulation market shares of ESAG,
DDGAG, EVCS, and DRAG are shown in Fig. 2(b)-Fig. 2(e),
respectively. At hours 8, 9, 18, 19, 20, 21, the DSO sells energy
to the wholesale market since the prices of energy of the
wholesale market at these hours are high. The DSO buys
energy from the wholesale market at other hours.
The ESAG prefers offering regulation capacity-down ser-
vice since this can increase its charging level. This causes
the ESAG to offer regulation capacity-down service at hours
13, 14, 15, 16, when the regulation capacity-dwon price is
lower than the energy price in the wholesale market.
The DDGAG offers energy to the wholesale market at
peak hours 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22. During these peak
hours, the wholesale regulation capacity price is higher than
the wholesale energy price. Hence, the DDGAG offers regula-
tion capacity-up service at its maximum ramping rate (1MW ).
During peak hours, the DDGAG’s remaining capacity (4MW )
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Fig. 2. Hourly awarded energy, regulation capacity-up/capacity-down services
of (a) wholesale market (b) ESAG (c) DDGAG (d) EVCS (e) DRAG.
is offered to the wholesale energy market. However, at hour
18, the DDGAG assigns all its capacity for energy provision,
since the wholesale regulation capacity price is lower than the
wholesale energy price at this moment.
The EVCS purchases energy at hours 16 and 24, when
the wholesale energy price is the lowest among all the hours
when EVs are available. The EVCS offers regulation capacity-
up service at hours 19-22, since 1) the wholesale regulation
capacity-up price is high; and 2) the EVCS can increase EV
charge levels by offering regulation capacity-up service.
The DRAG does not purchase energy from the wholesale
market at peak hours. Also, it is not supplied by ESAG and
DDGAG at peak hours, as they both sell energy to the whole-
sale market. However, the DRAG prefers offering regulation
capacity to the wholesale market. Hence, it purchases energy
that is enough for offering regulation capacity-down service.
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Fig. 3. Variation of revenue of ESAG.
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Fig. 4. Variation of revenue of DDGAG.
2) Sensitivity Analysis: Sensitivity analysis is performed to
study the impacts of ESAG’s and DDAG’s energy price offers
on their revenue. For each study case i (i = 1, 2, ..., 40), the
market participants’ energy price offers are modified from their
base case values (in Table I) by a multiplier i/10.
a) ESAG Energy Price Offers: Fig. 3 shows the sen-
sitivity of ESAG’s total revenue with respect to its energy
price offers. In Case 1 with the lowest ESAG energy price
offer, the ESAG offers regulation capacity-down service at all
times even when its price offer for regulation capacity-down
service is lower than the wholesale regulation capacity-down
price. This is because ESAG can increase its charging level
by providing regulation capacity-down service, and the energy
gained during this charging period can be offered to the energy
market. Hence, the ESAG gains the highest total revenue in
this case. As the ESAG’s energy price offer increases (from
Case 2 to Case 11), its total revenue decreases. In Case 11,
the ESAG gains the lowest total revenue. This is beacuse in
Case 11, the ESAG’s revenue from regulation capacity market
is the lowest, as ESAG only offers regulation capacity service
at peak hours when the wholesale regulation capacity price is
high. After Case 11, the ESAG’s energy price offer is higher
than the wholesale energy price. This causes the ESAG to act
as demand and also offer regulation capacity-up service. By
offering regulation capacity-up service, the ESAG decreases
its charging level and increases its energy purchase from the
energy market. Therefore, the ESAG’s revenue from regulation
capacity market increases after Case 11 and becomes constant
after Case 17.
b) DDGAG Energy Price Offers: Fig. 4 shows the sen-
sitivity of DDGAG’s total revenue with respect to its energy
price offers. Before Case 8, the DDGAG’s energy price offer
is lower than the wholesale energy price at all the simulated
hours. Hence, the DDGAG sells all the energy to the wholesale
market while also providing regulation capacity-down service.
In Cases 9 and 10, the DDGAG’s energy price offer is lower
than the wholesale energy price at some (not all the) simulated
hours. Hence, it sells energy and provides capcaity-up service
during these hours. This causes its energy revenue to decrease
and regulation capacity revenue to increase. After Case 15, the
DDGAG’s energy price offer is higher than the whole market
price. This prevents the DDGAG from selling energy to the
wholesale market, and also causes the DDGAG to provide
regulation capacity-up service only. Therefore, the DDGAG’s
regulation capacity revenue becomes constant after Case 15.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a DSO framework for coordinat-
ing DER aggregators to partcipate in the wholesale en-
ergy/regulation markets and retail energy market. Various
types of aggregators are considered in the DSO operation. Case
studies on a small distribution grid show the key interactions
among wholesale energy/regulation markets, retail energy mar-
ket operation, and DER aggregators’ market participation.
Sensitity analysis shows the DER aggregators’ total revenue
tends to decrease as they increase their energy price offers.
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